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On 28 June 2018, Advocate General Evgeni Tanchev delivered his Opinion in the Case
C‑216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v LM on the surrender of a crime suspect to
Poland.
The issue is whether Mr. Artur Celmer, referred to by the Opinion as LM, should be
surrendered from Ireland to Poland when there are serious doubts as to whether he would
receive a fair trial, due to the alleged lack of independence of the judiciary resulting from
recent changes to the Polish judicial system.
More specifically, does the executing judicial authority have to follow earlier jurisprudence
of the CJEU developed in Aranyosi and Căldăraru when deciding on whether or not to
postpone the execution of a European Arrest Warrant (EAW)? If yes, a further issue is
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whether the executing judiciary has to engage in a two-stage examination, as suggested in
Aranyosi, or whether the LM case should be distinguished and thus the applicable judicial
test accordingly modified.
1.     Upholding the rule of law; under Article 7 TEU and within
the context of surrender procedures
AG Tanchev’s Opinion correctly distinguishes the present case from the procedure
conducted according to Article 7 TEU, like the one triggered against Poland on 20
December 2017. The High Court of Ireland already emphasized the political nature of the
latter proceeding, and it came to the conclusion that the outcome of an Article 7 procedure
is less relevant for a national court deciding on surrender. Instead, documents produced
during the process may serve as persuasive evidence.
The AG, however, identified other differences, from which two will be singled out here. First,
he argued that the two procedures do not have the same objectives. Under Article 7(1)
TEU, the Council assesses whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the values
referred to in Article 2 TEU, whereas a decision on surrender, concerned “the examination
by the executing judicial authority [of] the existence of a real risk of breach not of a value
common to the Member States but of a fundamental right”. (paragraph 38) This statement
gives the false semblance that fundamental rights are somehow not common values. The
contrary is true: the EU is founded on a fundamental rights culture, as underlined by Article
2 TEU.
Second, the Opinion contends that the application of the Framework Decision on the EAW
may only be suspended in line with Recital (10), if the sanctioning prong of Article 7 TEU is
made use of and the Council determines a breach, and not just a mere risk of a breach of
values listed in Article 2 TEU. In contrast, he recalls the Aranyosi doctrine, where a real risk
of a breach of a fundamental right was permitted to potentially lead to the suspension of
actual surrender cases (paragraphs 41-44). One could, however, argue that the drafters of
the Framework Decision on the EAW meant to refer to Article 7 as such, which had only
two paragraphs when the Framework Decision was drafted. In the meantime, a third,
preventive arm has been added, which should now be read into Recital (10).
2.     LM turned into Aranyosi 2.0
Differentiating between the two procedures leads the AG to conclude that the national court
has to decide whether or not to execute a European Arrest Warrant even if an Article 7
procedure is pending. Albeit on different grounds – and here we tend to agree with the High
Court of Ireland, emphasising the political nature of Article 7 – this conclusion is correct.
However, we disagree with the AG’s argument that the only alternative to an Article 7 TEU
procedure resulting in the suspension of instruments based on mutual trust is the executing
national authority following the Aranyosi doctrine. Instead, the AG’s Opinion could have
followed the CJEU’s case law in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, where the
2/6
CJEU emphasised the importance of the national judiciary for the enforcement of EU law,
and entrusted itself to assess the judicial independence of those national courts which
apply and interpret EU law.
The AG’s Opinion should have acknowledged that a lack of judicial independence
jeopardizes all fundamental rights, not just the right to a fair trial singled out here. Once the
case was approached from a rule of law perspective, the Opinion could have proposed a
freezing mechanism that we suggested in our previous blog entry and that is also
advocated by Professors Carrera and Mitsilegas. As further discussed below, all further
weaknesses of the Opinion flow from this fundamental misconstruction of the issue as a
human rights problem instead of a rule of law matter.
2.1 First prong of Aranyosi and a “flagrant denial of justice” test
In Aranyosi, the CJEU established a two-prong-test for checking the general fundamental
rights situation in a country and the potential risks of human rights violations in the
individual case. Once the obligation for the executing judicial authority to employ the
Aranyosi test was established, the question arose to what extent this jurisprudence was
applicable, when a derogable right was at stake, such as the right to a fair trial, and not an
absolute one, like the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.
In the AG’s view, a derogable right may still be capable of giving rise to an obligation to
postpone the execution of EAWs, if certain conditions are met (paragraphs 57-58). The
Opinion stressed that the right to a fair trial may be subject to limitations, unless these
limitations are so severe that the essence of that right is violated. Therefore, in the AG’s
view in order for the executing authority to postpone surrender, there must be a real risk not
of a breach of the right to a fair trial, but of a “flagrant denial of justice” (paragraphs 72-77).
However, the AG does not cite the warning of AG Sharpston in Radu: “such a test […]
seems to me unduly stringent. […] a trial that is only partly fair cannot be guaranteed to
ensure that justice is done.” Additionally, recent CJEU case-law suggests that the standard
of proof shall be lower than a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice.
AG Tranchev, however, looks at a different jurisdiction and underpins his position by the
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). For an example for a
successful determination of a flagrant denial of justice, the AG recalls rather extreme cases
involving complicity with torture (paragraph 92). The AG admits that these judgments are,
to date, the only ones where the ECtHR has found a breach of the Convention on account
of the lack of independence and impartiality of the courts (paragraph 94). In other words, if
the AG’s Opinion was to be followed, there would be virtually no situations where a flagrant
breach could be determined.
Such a reading leads to the rather absurd conclusion that if there is a risk of a human rights
violation due to inhumane prison conditions (like in Aranyosi), surrender may be postponed.
On the other hand, the bar for establishing a violation of fair trial rights due to systemic rule
of law problems is put so high that there is virtually no way for it to be met except in
situations in which Member States are complicit in the torture of individuals.
2.2 Second prong of Aranyosi
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As to the second prong of the test, several legal issues arose. One of the most
fundamental ones was whether this part of the test is even applicable. The Irish High
Court’s suggestion was that it would be unrealistic to require a suspect to establish that
deficiencies of a legal system have an effect on the proceedings to which he is subject. In
contrast, the AG Opinion required to be proven that the individual concerned is exposed to
a risk of flagrant denial of justice.
In the AG’s view, an Article 7(1) TEU procedure alone does not prove that suspects
automatically have a real risk of breach of their right to a fair trial. In his opinion, “it cannot
be ruled out that, in certain situations, the courts of that Member State are capable of
hearing a case with the independence required by the […] Charter” (paragraph 103).
Inspired by the Commission’s arguments, the Opinion concludes that even if the first prong
of the Aranyosi test is satisfied, “this cannot be taken to mean that no Polish court is
capable of hearing any case whatever in compliance with the second paragraph of Article
47 of the Charter” (paragraph 108, emphasis in original). Again, the Opinion invokes
extremely severe human rights violations that are unthinkable in intra-Community cases. It
references Mo.M. v. France, where the examination of the Applicant’s personal situation
has shown that his sending back to Chad, which he had fled after being arrested and
tortured by the Chadian authorities, would have breached the ECHR (paragraph 110).
When determining this second issue, the Opinion gives some guidance. The executing
judicial authority has to take account of the particular circumstances of the case, relating
both to the individual concerned (e.g. whether he or she “is a political opponent or belongs
to a social or ethnic minority that is discriminated against”) and to the crime in question (e.g.
whether the offence is political in nature, has been committed in exercise of free speech, or
has been the subject of public declarations by representatives of those in power)
(paragraphs 103, 113, 114).
Criticism may be formulated with regard to the above requirements.
First, if one of the above issues can be proven, it is probably not the Aranyosi test that
would be applicable. Recital (12) of the Framework Decision states that “nothing in this
Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person […]
when there are reasons to believe [that the] arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose
of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic
origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person’s
position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons.” This recital could be used to interpret
Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW, and thereby the surrender procedure
could be halted on the basis of that provision alone without making use of the Aranyosi test.
Second, the term “political opponent” is rather vague and might be difficult to prove. One
shall be reminded that illiberal regimes go after anyone who formulates government
criticism including journalists fighting fake news, members of the academia proving
scientific facts and NGO representatives advocating human rights, irrespectively of whether
they are politically active or not. Third, institutional discrimination is very difficult to prove.
Fourth, the above test does not fully grasp the nature of constitutional capture. Indeed,
political opponents may be silenced, and disadvantaged groups, such as the Roma or
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asylum seekers may be further discriminated. But it cannot be concluded that apart from
these groups, most suspects may get a fair trial. Capture of the judiciary involves in-built
corruption. It also gives a free hand to organised crime, perhaps even leading to the
situation that one would rather not want to surrender an individual to a certain Member
State because it might lead to impunity.
2.3 Burden of proof, acquisition of evidence
According to the AG’s Opinion, the burden of proof is on the individual concerned to
establish that there are substantial grounds to believe that there is a real risk of a flagrant
denial of justice in the issuing state in his or her case. When deciding on this issue, the
executing authority has to consider objective, reliable, specific and properly updated
information. The Commission’s reasoned proposal to have Article 7 TEU triggered can be
taken into account, if that document is read in conjunction with any legislative changes
passed after the reasoned proposal had been adopted. These requirements mix up the
responsibilities of the Commission as guardian of the rule of law and individuals who do not
possess an apparatus demonstrating risks to their fundamental rights. At a certain point the
onus should shift to the state accused of rule of law violations.
Finally, the AG Opinion’s requirement that the executing authority shall acquire from the
issuing judicial authority all the necessary supplementary information (paragraphs 122-
128), presupposes that a captured court would be capable of engaging in a judicial
dialogue about its own and its peers’ independence.
3.     Conclusion
The legal construction of a problem determines the solution found. The above assessment
of AG Tanchev’s Opinion is a demonstration of why a lack of judicial independence should
be framed as a rule of law issue. The AG Opinion’s construction of the case as a potential
human rights deficiency renders challenges to rule of law violations hypothetical. Against
the backdrop of the current limitations, the suggestion to address rule of law problems in
fully-fledged Article 7 (2)-(3) procedures is not feasible; whereas the alternative path, the
modified two prong Aranyosi test, is incoherent and not workable in practice. Shall the AG
Opinion’s line of argumentation be adopted by the CJEU, its guidance for national courts is
likely to result in impunity for Member States violating the rule of law, as well as individual
exposure to fundamental rights infringements. This again might lead certain national
executing judicial authorities to develop their own tests, trumping or endangering the
primacy and effectiveness of EU law.
The above controversy serves as a reminder that “mutual trust cannot survive when one
national system ceases to be governed by the rule of law” (see the blog post by Professors
Scheppele and Pech). Should the EU shy away from creating a working monitoring and
supervisory mechanism for Article 2 TEU values – which national courts could take into
account when assessing whether mutual trust is still deserved – it will neither uphold EU
law’s autonomy, nor the values behind EU integration. And vice versa: reinforcing the EU’s
distinct constitutional features via a strong rule of law supervision would reinforce mutual
trust.
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